ページ番号1004490 更新日 平成30年2月16日

PEMEX may be on the path to a breakthrough. Pity the details.

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レポートID 1004490
作成日 2014-09-03 01:00:00 +0900
更新日 2018-02-16 10:50:18 +0900
公開フラグ 1
媒体 石油・天然ガス資源情報
分野 企業基礎情報
著者
著者直接入力 ヤスミン・シンクレア
年度 2014
Vol 0
No 0
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抽出データ 更新日:2014/9/3 ワシントン事務所:ヤスミン・シンクレア (BBC News, Reuters, EIA, CRS, Mayer Brown) (企業,基礎情報) ・2012年12月に就任したメキシコのエンリケ・ペーニャ・ニエト大統領(制度的革命党:PRI)は、2013年8月に一連のエネルギー改革を提案した。同国における最も喫緊の課題の一つである国営石油会社Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)の生産減退に取り組むために、ペーニャ大統領は野党との間に合意を得て、同国の石油・天然ガス産業に対する民間投資を可能とする憲法改正を行った1。 ・この改革は現在法制化され、PEMEXの76年にも及ぶメキシコのエネルギー産業における独占的地位を解消した。外国の石油企業は今やメキシコに参入可能であり、PEMEXはこれら企業との競争に曝されることになる。国際石油メジャーのエクソンモービルや、ロイヤル・ダッチ・シェル、ロシアのルクオイルは、2015年第1四半期に実施されると言われている最初の入札への参加意欲を有する企業として名を連ねる2。エネルギー改革の実現はペーニャ政権の試金石であったが、6年間の任期の最初の1年目で達成されたのである。 ・とはいえ、安全の問題をはじめ克服すべき課題がまだ残されていることにも留意が必要であろう。 本稿につきましては、後日和文翻訳版を掲載する予定です。 . INTRODUCTION Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is Mexico’s state oil company. It was established in 1938, becoming one of the world’s first national oil company, granting PEMEX full monopoly on the oil and gas sectors. It is both Mexico’s “cash cow,”3 accounting for 13% of the country's export earnings and about 32% of total government revenues in 2013.4 PEMEX is also Mexico’s “sacred cow”.5 Mexicans have grown up to the 1PEMEX may be on the path to a breakthrough. Pity the details. 1 Goldwyn, David L., “Mexico Rising: Comprehensive Energy Reform at Last?,” Atlantic Council, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, December 2013, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Mexico_Rising.pdf, p. 1. 2 Grant, Will, “Mexico awards 83% of oil reserves to state firm PEMEX,” BBC News, August 13, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28776695 , accessed August 20, 2014. 3 Samples, Tim R and Jose Luis Vittor, The Past, Present, and Future of Energy in Mexico: Prospects for Reform Under the Pena Nieto Administration (September 4, 2013). Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 101, 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2315306, p. 699, accessed June 16, 2014. 4 U.S. Department of Energy. Country Analysis Briefs, Mexico, April 24, 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Energy Information Administration), 1, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Mexico/mexico.pdf, accessed on July 16, 2014. (Hereafter EIA.) 5 Samples, Tim and Jose Luis Vittor supra note 2, p.699. - 1 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 antra of “The oil is ours!”,6 with many Mexicans viewing state control of the energy sector as synonymous with its revolutionary heritage.7 PEMEX affects the life of every single Mexican, with 30% to 40% of the federal government’s income coming from PEMEX.8 But the dual roles of money-maker and public icon are taking a toll on Mexico and PEMEX. Due its enormous tax obligations to Mexico’s coffers and being constrained to address declines of its domestic oil prediction, PEMEX has thus been short of investment opportunities with which to fund expansion and modernization projects.9 Mexican crude output has been in a free fall for the past decade. From its peak of 3.85 million barrels per day (bbl/d) ten years ago, Mexico produced 2.90 million bbl/d in 2013.10 That number represents nearly a loss of 1 million bbl/d. (See Graph A.) 6 Villagran, Lauren, “Long a state monopoly, Mexico’s oil sector moves to embrace outside world,” The Christian Science Monitor, August 13, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0813/Long-a-state-monopoly-Mexico-s-oil-sector-moves-to-embrace-outside-world, accessed on July 15, 2014. 7 Johnson, Keith, “Reform meets reality in Mexico’s energy sector,” The Monitor, June 27, 2014, http://www.themonitor.com/business/reform-meets-reality-in-mexico-s-energy-sector/article_7a6dc338-fe56-11e3-8747-0017a43b2370.html, accessed on July 1, 2014. 8 Samples, Tim and Jose Luis Vittor, supra note 2, p. 699. 9 Navarrete Lopez, George Eduardo (2010) Powering up: Latin America's energy challenges: the Mexican oil reform: before and after. IDEAS reports - strategic updates, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SU005. LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43679/, p. 43, accessed July 17, 2014. 10 Yo, Michael, “Mexico’s energy reform seeks to reverse decline in oil production,” EIA, May 27, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16431, accessed on July 1, 2014. - 2 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 . Mexico’s Oil Production in Peaking in 2004, Declining Thereafter (U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) Data Released April 24, 2014) Source : EIA In an effort to address the significant decline of Mexico’s oil industry, days before the end of 2013, President Pena signed into law a constitutional amendment enabling foreign companies to enter Mexico’s oil and gas fields.11 On December 20, 2013, President Pena, effectively ended PEMEX’s 76-year monopoly over the oil and gas sector. The irony lies in the fact that he is of the same party that nationalized Mexico’s oil industry in 1938.12 The future of Mexico and PEMEX are inextricably intertwined, thus also affecting the United States. While Mexico is not a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it is one of the top ten largest world oil producers, the third largest in the Western Hemisphere, and a key energy partner to the 11 Seelke, Clare Ribando, Michael Ratner, M. Angeles Villarreal, Curry L. Hagerty, “Mexico’s Oil and Gas Sector: Background, Reform Efforts, and Implications for the United States,” CRS Report R43313 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2014). 12 Goldwyn, supra note 1. - 3 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 .S.13 Behind Canada and Saudi Arabia, Mexico is the third largest crude exporter to the U.S. (See Graph B). The U.S. thus has a vested interest on the potential implications of Mexico’s energy sector reforms. The U.S. is Mexico’s largest trading partner, along with ranking second to Canada as the largest export market.14 Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 has solidified U.S.-Mexico economic integration. Trade between the two countries soared to 506% between 1993 and 2012.15 . Top 3 U.S. Importers: Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia (EIA Data released June 27, 2014) B In the early decades of the 20th century, foreign investors primarily from Great Britain and the U.S. helped catapult Mexico as the world’s second largest oil producer, with Mexico producing a quarter of world’s oil 13 EIA, supra note 2. 14 Seelke, et al., supra note 11, page 10. 15 Ibid. - 4 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 . PEMEX PAST 2Source : EIA ntil the nationalization of its oil industry in 1938.16 But due to the bloody Mexican revolution (1910-1920) and the severe restrictions on the private sector enshrined in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, investment in Mexico’s hydrocarbons sectors eventually declined.17 Article 27 gives the federal government full ownership, and “the Nation shall carry out the exploitation of [hydrocarbons]”.18 Article 28 furthermore states that “oil and all the hydrocarbons” and “basic petrochemistry” are “strategic areas” for state activity.19 These two key Articles, along with numerous bills and regulations, consider every activity concerning the hydrocarbons industry as strategic, thus justifying all exploitation to be the domain of the state.20 In the intervening years between the end of the Mexican revolution and the nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico in 1938, foreign companies held sway in Mexico. However, government policies gradually blurred the lines between social welfare programs and the oil industry that are still extant today. Oil policies evolved, creating state agencies responsible for exploration and development, operating in tandem with commercial enterprises. The culmination of such oil policies was the creation of Petroleos de Mexico S.A. (Petromex). It was created in 1925 to take full control of oil production, including price controls and distribution. Petromex was a hybrid private-public venture, with only Mexican citizens owning equity in it. It ultimately failed.21 Due to the onerous restrictions of the Mexican Constitution, building tension between foreign companies and the Mexican government culminated on March 18, 1938. Responding to what it saw as unfair labor practices combined with poor management of its oil resources by foreign companies, without a resolution, President Lazaro Cardenas expropriated U.S. and other foreign interests in Mexico’s oil industry.22 From the ashes of the failed Petromex and in the aftermath of the expropriation, PEMEX was born and so was the iconic slogan for all Mexicans: “El petroleo es nuestro.” The petroleum is ours.23 Indeed, the majority of Mexicans view its natural resources as near to their birthright, with ownership thereof to the people. Although Mexican oil industry was nationalized, by writ of the Constitution, PEMEX still pursued service 16 Hogan, Jeffrey P., Lt. Col, USMC, “Reforming Mexico’s Energy Sector to Enhance Stability,” Naval War College, October 27, 2011, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA555290, p. 6, accessed June 17, 2014, and Samples, Tim. and Jose Luis Vittor, supra note 2, p. 715. 17 Seelke, et al., supra note 10, p. 2. 18 Parker, Dallas, Jose L. Valera, Pablo C. Ferrante, Christopher P.B. Erckert, Joh, D. Furlow, Gabriel J. Salinas, “Mexico’s President Unveils Historic Proposal to Open the Country’s Energy Sector to Private Investment,” Mayer Brown, October 21, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Mexicos-President-Unveils-Historic-Proposal-to-Open-the-Countrys-Energy-Sector-to-Private-Investment-10-21-2013/, accessed July 1, 2014. [Hereafter Mayer Brown.] 19 Perez Vazquez, Carlos, transl, “The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States,” http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf, accessed July 18, 2014, p. 38. 20 Morales, Isidro, Ph.D., “The Twilight of Mexico’s State Oil Monopolism: Policy, Economic, and Political Trends In Mexico’s Natural Gas Industry,” Center for Energy Studies at Rice University's Baker Institute, December 9, 2013, http://bakerinstitute.org/files/4836/download/, accessed June 17, 2014, p. 14. 21 Hogan, supra note, 16, p. 6. 22 Ibid. - 5 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 ontracts with foreign companies. But the enactment of the Petroleum Law of 1958 effectively ended all such cooperation with the private sector. After 1958, only cash payments were allowed in service contracts, and compensation through shares or profits were completely erased.24 3. PEMEX PRESENT Despite having one of the most onerous and restrictive legal limitations for petroleum investment among oil-producer nations, PEMEX is still a stand-out. It ranks 36th in Forbes Global 500 for 2014.25(Brazil’s Petroleo Brasilero S.A. or Petrobras is listed 28th.) Among the top 500 of Latin American companies, it ranked second in 2009 behind Petrobras and ahead of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA).26It is the world’s seventh largest oil-producer with $123 billion in revenues and made $53 billion in profit before taxes in 2013.27 But its total loss for 2013 was $13 billion, with loss for the first quarter of 2014 at $2.74 billion.28 But the days of easy oil for Mexico are fast approaching. In 2013, Mexico pumped 2.90 bbl/d, a continuing decline from its peak in 2004 of 3.85 million bbl/d. As of April 2014, crude oil production was around 2.5 million bbl/d. This represents Mexico’s lowest monthly average since 1995.29 Mexico’s replacement rate underscores the bleak numbers from EIA. Mexico’s capacity to replace its certified oil and gas reserves fell significantly: from 104.3% in 2012 to 67.8% in 2013.30 PEMEX is clearly facing challenges. Its heady days were in the 1970s, with the discovery of the huge offshore Cantarell oil field.31 It has been the largest oil field ever discovered in Mexico, and has been a boon for Mexico. Since production began in the late 1970s, it has generated about $500 billion to Mexico’s coffers.32 But decreases in Mexico’s oil production are a result of natural declines in Cantarell and other offshore fields.33 The need for reform of Mexico’s oil industry has been understood for decades. Several Mexican presidents have tried to reform Mexico’s energy industry, most notably, former President Felipe Calderon of Mexico’s 23 Samples, Tim. and Jose Luis Vittor, supra note 3, p. 716. 24 Ibid. 25 http://fortune.com/global500/pemex-36/, accessed July 18, 2014. 26 http://rankings.americaeconomia.com/2010/500/ranking-500-america-latina.php, accessed July 18, 2014. 27 Webber, Jude and John Paul Rathbone, “Energy: back to black,” Financial Times, June 23, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b14f4110-f546-11e3-91a8-00144feabdc0.html, accessed July 18, 2014. 28 Williams, Adam, “Mexico Oil Opening May Release Gusher for Foreigners,” Bloomberg Markets Magazine, May 13, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-13/mexico-oil-opening-may-release-gusher-for-foreigners.html, accessed June 10, 2014. 29 Yo, Michael, supra note 9. 30 Barrera, Adriana, Alexandra Alper, Lisa Shumaker, “Mexican capacity to replace oil, gas reserves falls in 2013 ? Pemex,” Reuters, May 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/mexico-pemex-idUSL1N0O203620140516, accessed June 27, 2014. 31 Seelke, supra note 10, p. 2. 32 Samples, Tim. and Jose Luis Vittor, supra note 2, p. 703. 33 EIA, supra note 3. - 6 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 enter-right party, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) in 2008. His proposals became law, but not until they had been diluted by opposition lawmakers in the Mexican Congress led by centrist Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Maintaining PEMEX’s dual roles of money-maker and near-religious icon has become untenable. On the domestic level, Mexico depends on oil revenues to fund everything from social welfare programs to drug interdiction operations. Due in part to heavy tax from the government, PEMEX has been operating at a loss since 1998, which in turn only increases its debt burden. While the government has been heavily dependent of PEMEX revenues, it has not in turn reinvested in technology and exploration.34 For decades, the topic of energy reform had been “taboo”35. Along with declining oil production, PEMEX needs to attract investment, technology, and skilled labor. These factors, along with instilling a new “culture of productivity” in PEMEX, have opened the doors to reform. 36 During the Mexican presidential campaign of 2012, Enrique Pena Nieto from PRI campaigned openly in favor of reforming the Mexican energy sector. Post-inauguration, Mr. Pena unveiled his constitutional energy reform proposal to the Mexican Senate on August 12, 2013.37 His proposal would have removed hydrocarbons from the list of “strategic areas” and allowed PEMEX to form “profit-sharing” deals with international companies for exploration and production (E&P) projects. Under the reform proposal, PEMEX also would have been allowed to sign agreements with private companies for downstream operations including refining, transporting oil and gas, and producing petrochemicals.38 Mr. Pena’s proposal came soon after a separate proposal from PAN.39 PAN’s reforms would have gone a step further, allowing oil and gas upstream and downstream operations open to private sector investment and competition.40 The PAN proposal is the party most open to private players in the Mexican energy industry.41A PRI-PAN alliance soon enabled the approval of the reforms in December 2013. The leftist Partido de la Revoluccion Democratica (PRD) opposed all private involvement in PEMEX. In the end, the reforms did pass, being approved by the Mexican Congress and a majority of 31 state legislatures under the auspices of a PRI-PAN alliance. Mr. Pena signed the constitutional reforms into law on 34 Samples, Tim. and Jose Luis Vittor, supra note 2, p. 707. 35 Zissis, Carin, “2014Mexico City Blog: Energy Reform Panel and Hydrocarbons Undersecretary Lourdes Melgar,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, May 12, 2014, http://www.as-coa.org/events/2014-latin-american-cities-conferences-mexico-city/blogs/2014-mexico-city-blog-energy-reform-panel-and-hydrocarbons-undersecretary-lourdes-melgar, accessed July 1, 2014. 36 Ibid. 37 Mayer Brown, supra note 15. 38 Seelke, supra note 10, p. 3. 39 Mayer Brown, supra note 15. 40 Mayer Brown, “Sweeping Mexico Energy Reform Proposal,” August 2, 2013, http://www.mayerbrown.com/Sweeping-Mexico-Energy-Reform-Proposal-08-02-2013/, accessed July 18, 2014. 41 Frederick, James, “Mexico’s PAN party presents reform to break oil, power monopolies,” Business News Americas, August 1, 2013. - 7 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 ecember 20, 2013. It is important to note that PEMEX remains a state-owned enterprise. It has not been privatized. Some important key reforms include: ? Creation of four oil and gas exploration and production contract models: service contracts, profit-sharing, production-sharing, and licenses. ? Establishment of Mexican Petroleum Fund to be managed by the Central Bank. ? Maintain state ownership of subsoil hydrocarbons resources, but allowing companies to take ownership of those resources once they have been extracted, and to book reserves for accounting ? ? purposes. Open downstream operations to private investment. Give PEMEX first refusal on developing Mexican resources before private companies can begin bidding rounds (Round Zero). ? Keep PEMEX state-owned but with budget autonomy, and a board of directors that does not include union representation. PEMEX will have to bid with other firms on new projects. The reforms also expand the regulatory authority of the Energy Secretariat (SENER) and the National Hydrocarbon Commission (CNH). Regarding Round Zero, PEMEX has expressed its desire to retain and develop the Perdido Fold Belt and the Lakach gas fields, among other areas. FACTBOX* Mexico’s Three Main Political Parties fficially, Mexico has a multi-party system, which means that it has more than two dominant political parties. On the national level, however, three parties dominate. They are the PAN, the PRD, and the PRI. --PAN (Partido Accion Nacional): founded 1939; described as right of center; was once the largest party in the Senate --PRD (Partido de la Revoluccion Democratica): youngest of the three dominant parties, founded in 1989; left of center; has long held control of the Federal District of Mexico City --PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional): party of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto; has held power in Mexico for over 71 years under three different names; characterized as centrist; leading party in the Mexican Senate Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 - 8 - * O . ROUND ZERO OR WISH LIST Round Zero was a process that began on March 21st, whereby PEMEX presented to SENER a list of areas it wishes to keep for exploration and production. It is essentially a wish list for PEMEX.42 Although not publicly disclosed initially (CNH subsequently released details), PEMEX would like to keep 83% proven and probable reserves (known as 2P), while ceding to the government the remaining 17%.43 Round Zero will determine what resources Mexico will tender to other oil industry participants including international oil majors in the future.44 What this means is that PEMEX will stake its claim to keep its shallow-water fields, such as Cantarell, and Ku-Maloob-Zaap. These two fields together comprise half of Mexico’s production.45 Some analysts found more interesting what PEMEX left out of its wish list. Notably, PEMEX decided that deepwater and shale deposits are not its strong suits, thereby leaving open the possibility of forming ventures with private participation to exploit such prospects.46 These areas include Chicontepec and Perdido. A senior SENER official has stated that Round Zero will likely include “some areas in deep water, some shale gas, some unconventionals such as Chicontepec, and some areas in shallow waters”.47 5. NEXT STEPS RAMPED UP On April 30th, SENER presented to the Mexican Congress secondary legislation detailing how the reform would be implemented.48,49 Prospects for its passage looked bleak as PAN legislators staged a walk-out during debates.50 Also putting the legislation at risk was that the debate session ended in June, reconvening in September.51But through eleventh-hour debates, Mexico’s lower house approved the secondary legislation on 42 Webber, Jude, “Pemex wish list signals start of Mexican energy reform,” Financial Times, March 20, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e0a5c578-b019-11e3-b0d0-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2x5xghHT8, accessed August 8, 2014. 43 Harrup, Anthony, “PEMEX Seeks to Keep 83% of Proven, Probable Reserves,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304679404579459782160606454, accessed August 8, 2014. 44 Ibid. 45 Webber, supra note 38. 46 Noon, Chris, “Pemex plays to strengths with wish list,” Interfax Natural Gas Daily, March 31, 2014, http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/article/7487/pemex-plays-to-strengths-with-lsquowish-listrsquo, accessed August 8, 2014. 47 Ibid. 48 Gomez, Jr., Christian, “Get the Facts. Secondary Laws for Energy Reform Presented to Mexico’s Senate,” Americas Society/Council of the Americas, April 30, 2014, http://www.as-coa.org/blogs/get-facts-secondary-laws-energy-reform-presented-mexicos-senate, accessed July 1, 2014. 49 PEMEX Round Zero, http://sener.gob.mx/webSener/rondacero/_doc/Round%20Zero.pdf, accessed August 18, 2014. 50 Business News Americas staff reporters, “Mexico energy debate stalls as PAN walks out,” Business News Americas, June 19, 2014 51 Johnson, Tim, “Mexican opposition hold energy reform hostage,” Christian Science Monitor, June 20, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2014/0620/Mexican-opposition-holds-energy-reform-hostage, accessed July 15, 2014. Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 - 9 - uly 29th, paving the way for final approval for the historic energy reform.52Not long thereafter, the Senate gave its final approval. On August 6th, three months after its self-imposed deadline, the Senate passed the final measure with 78 votes in favor versus 26 against implementation of the constitutional reforms.53 Mr. Pena Nieto signed into law the new legislation on August 11th, ramping up the timetable for opening up Mexico’s energy markets to the private sector. Mr. Pena Nieto also said that by the end of August, his government will speed up the creation of a new natural-gas pipeline system.54 He also promised to start putting in place regulatory and oversight agencies needed to apply the new laws.55SENER had been expected to decide on Round Zero allocations by September 17th, but it did so one month ahead of schedule, during the week of August 11th. . ROUND ZERO UPSTREAM ALLOCATIONS IN DETAIL 6On Wednesday, August 13th, SENER granted PEMEX its original request of keeping 83% of 2P reserves. Its initial request of keeping 31% of Mexico’s prospective resources was shaved to 21%.56 SENER is said to doubt PEMEX’s ability to operate in deepwater offshore reserves and in shale fields. PEMEX is said to be “satisfied” with the areas it is expected to retain.57 PEMEX will also seek to form joint ventures with private companies to develop 10 projects.58 Its Round Zero allocations provide PEMEX with 20.6 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE), covering 90,000 square kilometers. It also gives PEMEX 12.45 billion BOE in proven reserves.59 The 10 projects will consist of four areas. The first group represents onshore and offshore mature fields, the goal of which is to optimize secondary recovery. The second group represents three heavy-oil fields which 52 Business News Americas staff reporters, “Mexico’s lower house paves way for energy reform,” Business News Americas, July 29, 2014, http://www.bnamericas.com/news/oilandgas/mexicos-lower-house-paves-way-for-energy-reform, accessed August 4, 2014. 53 Williams, Adam, and Eric Martin, “Mexico Passes Final Rules to Open Oil Industry to Private Firms,” Bloomberg, August 7, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-07/mexico-passes-final-rules-opening-oil-industry-to-private-firms.html, accessed, August 7, 2014. 54 Harrup, Anthony and Laurence Iliff, “Mexico Hastens Energy Ovehaul,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexico-hastens-energy-overhaul-1407803143, accessed August 12, 2014. 55Stevenston, Mark, “Mexico opens its fuel industries to investors,” Washington Times, August 12, 2014, p. A8. 56 Alire Garcia, David, Tomas Sarmiento and Adriana Barrera, “Mexico assigns Pemex 83 pct of 2P reserves, 21 pct of prospective resources,” Reuters, August 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2N0QJ1IU20140813, accessed August 13, 2014. 57 Montes, Juan and Laurence Iliff, “Pemex to be well provided for in Mexican Energy Overhaul,” Wall Street, Journal, August 12, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/pemex-to-be-well-provided-for-in-mexican-energy-sector-overhaul-1407875457?KEYWORDS=pemex, accessed August 13, 2014. 58 Iliff, Laurence, “Mexico Outlines Plan to Open Some Oil Reserves to Foreign Companies,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexico-outlines-plan-to-open-some-oil-reserves-to-foreign-companies-1407957987?KEYWORDS=pemex, accessed August 13, 2014. 59 Alire Garcia, David, “FACTBOX: Mexico’s Round Zero and Round One oil projects,” Reuters, August 14, 2014, http://in.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=INL2N0QJ2Z620140813, accessed August 18, 2014. - 10 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 epresent high degree of technical complexities. They are Ayatsil, Tekel, and Uitzil. The third group will consist of the giant deep water gas basin located in the Lakach field, requiring $6.8 billion investment minimum. The fourth package will mean seeking joint ventures to develop the deepwater fields in Perdido. The Perdido is projected to hold 500 million BOE, and will require $11 billion over a span of 8 years. Along with field disclosures, SENER announced tendered contracts, Comprehensive Exploration and Production (CIEP's) and Financed Public Works Contracts (COPF's), will migrate to new contract forms for E&P activities. Energy analysts note that migration will occur in two stages. The first stage will occur between August and December 2014, covering eleven contracts and the second stage will happen in 2015, in which PEMEX will apply for new contractual arrangements for the 11 fields it was assigned, taking advantage of the new more favorable tax structure.60 that previously . ROUND ONE DETAILED 7Round One details the process of foreign E&P engagement in Mexico’s upstream sector. In November 2014, the government will release for comment the model contract types, structures, and fiscal terms. In February 2015, bid packages will be released, with contracts being awarded between May and September. On offer will be 169 blocks: 109 for exploration, and 60 for exploitation. Blocks in Round One may and can be modified by the Mexican government on the basis of industry feedback. Mexico would like to have at least one public tender per year until 2018, when Mr. Pena’s current administration ends.61 CNH will be in charge of the bidding process and award contracts. The new law provides the following contract models: (a) service contracts; (b) licenses; and (c) profit-sharing; and (d) production-sharing contracts.62 i. ii. Service contracts: all production belongs to the government, and payments shall be made only in cash. Licenses: the contractor may take and own all production at the wellhead. The contractor must pay a signing bonus; exploratory phase fees; royalties; and a percentage of the contract value of production. All payments will be in cash, along with any taxes owed by the contractor. 60 Alire Garcia, David and Tomas Sarmiento, “UPDATE 3-Mexico hopes to lure $50.5 billion in historic oil tender,” Reuters, August 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/13/mexico-reforms-energy-idUSL2N0QJ1MG20140813, accessed August 20, 2014. 61 Montes, Juan, “Mexico Opens Energy Sector to Private Investors,” Wall Street, Journal, August 7, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexico-opens-energy-sector-to-private-investors-1407392884?KEYWORDS=PEMEX, accessed, August 7, 2014. 62 Mayer Brown, “Analysis of Mexico’s New Hydrocarbons Legal Regime,” Mayer Brown, August 14, 2014, http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/69fe7acd-ca5b-4d1c-a172-31678b13ec06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/75b0fe83-d4a2-4523-b8e2-3f7ae78102a7/UPDATE-Analysis-of-Mexicos-New-Hydrocarbons-Legal-Regime.pdf, accessed August 18, 2014. - 11 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 ii. Profit-sharing: the contractor will deliver all production to a marketing firm retained by the CNH, sale proceeds of which shall go to the Mexico Oil Fund. The Fund shall retain money owed to the government. Contractor will be paid its cost recover along with its share of profits in cash monthly. iv. Production-sharing: payments to the contractor will be in-kind equivalent to its recovery cost and its share of operating profits. Regarding royalties, the price per barrel of oil will be the determinant. The royalty rate is 7.5% if the price of oil goes below $48. If the contract price per barrel of crude oil is $48 or above, the formula below is applied: [(0.125 x price per barrel) + 1.5]% According to the formula, if the contract price per barrel of crude oil is at $100, then the royalty would be 14%.63 The complete text of the press release for Round One can be found in Spanish here: http://www.sener.gob.mx/portal/Default_blt.aspx?id=2921 The reforms could prove to be a gusher of new investment from U.S. firms. They are a win-win for foreign private firms that had long been locked out of Mexico for 76 years. However, there are potential red flags for interested foreign companies. They are required to form a wholly-owned Mexican subsidiary helping Mexico to collect taxes from development. Mexico also requires 20% stake in fields that cross national borders.64 Local content requirements may also seem to be onerous. Upon initial release of secondary legislation, Mexico required that private energy firms source at least 25% of their supplies from Mexican firms by 2025. During the debate, legislators upped the requirement to 35%.65 . SECURITY ISSUES 8However, new entrants in Mexico’s upstream sector both large and small will have to be cognizant of the issue of security. During the first five months of 2014, Tamaulipas, bordering the U.S. southern state of Texas, 63 Vera, Manuel and Andrew S. Farris, “Mexican President Signs Historic Energy Reform Into Law,” National Law Review, August 18, 2014, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/mexican-president-signs-historic-energy-reform-law, accessed August, 18, 2014. 64 Colman, Zack, “Why the U.S. could be the big winner of Mexico’s energy reforms,” Washington Examiner, August 8, 2014, http://washingtonexaminer.com/why-the-u.s.-could-be-the-big-winner-of-mexicos-energy-reforms/article/2551835#, accessed, August 8, 2014. 65 Harrup, Anthony and Laurence Iliff, “Mexico Hastens Energy Ovehaul,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/mexico-hastens-energy-overhaul-1407803143, accessed August 12, 2014. - 12 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 06 murders had occurred.66 The Eagle Ford Shale formation that lies in southern Texas extends into the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Coahuila.67 In Mexico, it is known as the Burgos Basin. (See Map 1.) High-risk areas such as these may hamper investment. Companies and their employees may experience illegal pipeline taps, fuel thefts, escalating to kidnapping, extortion, and murder. The levels of violence in Tamaulipas sometime resemble a war zone.68 Investors will face challenges to infrastructure safety into onshore areas of Mexico’s energy industry. Energy analysts add that drug gangs and organized crime rings have deeply penetrated the aforementioned Mexican states. Map 1. Burgos Basin Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)69 . FINAL WORDS 9is said to hold 26 billion barrels of oil equivalent. With production-sharing contracts and Mexico 66 Flannery, Nathaniel Parish, “Will Security Problems Hamper Mexico’s Energy Boom?” Forbes, August 18, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2014/08/18/will-security-problems-hamper-mexicos-energy-boom/, accessed August 19, 2014. 67 Cattan, Nacha and Adam Williams, “Drug Gangs Attacking With Tanks Block Mexican Shale Boom,” Bloomberg, June 12, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-12/drug-gangs-attacking-with-tanks-block-mexican-shale-boom.html, accessed August 20, 2014. 68 Ibid. 69 http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3007/fs-2004-3007.html Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。 - 13 - rivate-sharing contracts now available to private companies, the government hopes that the energy overhaul will help attract billions of dollars in foreign investment in Mexico. Mexico hopes to attract $50.5 billion in new investment by 2018.70 The reforms have created an environment allowing PEMEX to be competitive. 70 Alire Garcia, David and Tomas Sarmiento, supra note 57. - 14 - Global Disclaimer(免責事項) 本資料は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構(以下「機構」)調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本資料に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本資料は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本資料に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本資料の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。
地域1 中南米
国1 メキシコ
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国・地域 中南米,メキシコ
2014/09/03 ヤスミン・シンクレア
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