ページ番号1007220 更新日 平成30年2月16日

Consequences of the US tight oil revolution(国際セミナー)

レポート属性
レポートID 1007220
作成日 2014-02-18 01:00:00 +0900
更新日 2018-02-16 10:50:18 +0900
公開フラグ 1
媒体 セミナー・報告会資料
分野 エネルギー一般非在来型
著者
著者直接入力 Dr. Leo Drollas
年度 2013
Vol 0
No 0
ページ数
抽出データ ame--changer; is this really the case? tight oil output? technology, or oil prices versus tight oil costs? ??The tight oil revolution in the US has been described as a ??What is driving this revolution? The resource base, ??What have been the consequences of the surge in US ??The sharp fall in oil needed by the US from abroad. ??Opening up of the Brent--WTI differential. ??A surge in US petroleum product exports based on ??Will these trends continue in the future? relatively cheap domestic crude oil. 2 ources:
?EIA
?
?and
?CGES
?The US oil industry has evolved in such a way as to respond to price incentives. When the price of oil was low in the 1960s and early 1970s, incremental production kept on declining until surging oil prices during the crises of the 1970s and early 1980s arrested the rate of decline. Weakening prices caused the rate of decrease of US output to accelerate once more until surging prices from 2002 onwards sent incremental US production soaring with a lag of around six years. 3 rude oil production in the main oil-producing states (tbpd) Incremental oil production in these six states (tbpd) Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?The US tight oil revolution has manifested itself mainly in two states ? Texas and North Dakota ? both of which have seen a dramatic rise in oil production from 2009 onwards. Production in Oklahoma has also been rising gently in the last three years from a low base. Alaskan production is in long-term decline, while output in the offshore sector of the US Gulf has been dropping since 2010 after a brief spurt post 2008. The ?gure on the right shows incremental production in these states. Incremental output has been accelerating in both Texas and North Dakota; however, your attention is drawn to the downward blip in 2013 in North Dakota’s incremental production, the ?rst time this has happened in recent memory. 4 ource:
?Canadian
?Society
?for
?Unconven8onal
?Resources
? resources at 345 billion barrels,The EIA estimates worldwide technically recoverable tight oil spanning 41 countries, 95 basins and 137 rock formations.Tight oil does not ?ow naturally in the source rocks, which means that high density drilling is required to bring up as much oil as possible. Even so, only 1-5% of the oil in place is expected to be recovered versus 60-70% from conventional oil ?elds.The US is thought to have 58 bn bbls of recoverable tight oil, of which 48 bn bbls are in shale oil formations, the rest being in sandstones and carbonates.Tight oil is more capital intensive per barrel of oil produced than deepwater oil and the mega oil-sands projects that the major oil companies favour. Well costs for tight oil are typically in the $8-10mn range per well, bringing them within the ambit of smaller oil companies. Moreover, since production can be ramped up within months of the start of drilling, cost recovery is swift, which suits the smaller operators, who are usually pressed for cash.A tight oil project is likely to be successful if:?? there is good source rock?? water for hydraulic fracturing is abundant?? the sub-surface mineral rights belong to individuals?? drilling rigs and crews with the right skills are freely available?? the right infrastructure exists to collect and transport the oil to re?neries5 ost
?of
?the
?US’
?,ght
?oil
?is
?produced
?in
?two
?basins
??
?the
?Williston
?in
?North
?Dakota
?and
?the
?Eagle
?Ford
?in
?Texas,
?with
?1.0
? mbpd
?respec,vely.
?
?A
?further
?0.7
?mbpd
?comes
?from
?ten
?other
?,ght
?oil
?forma,ons.
?produc,on
?current
?and
?0.9
?of
?The
?N.
?Dakota
?Industrial
?Commission
?(NDIC)
?es,mates
?that
?a
?typical
?Bakken
?well
?costs
?$9mn
?to
?drill,
?with
?ini,al
?output
?of
?1,000
?bpd
?and
?cumula,ve
?produc,on
?of
?615,000
?bbls
?over
?45
?years.
?
?Capital
?and
?opera,ng
?costs
?average
?$21/bbl
?and
?taxes
?and
?royal,es
?add
?another
?$18/bbl;
?including
?a
?real
?rate
?of
?return
?of
?10%
?brings
?the
?total
?
?The
?same
?cost
?structure
?applies
?to
?the
?Eagle
?Ford
?forma,on,
?according
?to
?the
?NDIC.
?
?Rodgers
?Oil
?&
?Gas
?Consul,ng
?conclude
?that
?the
?average
?breakeven
?price
?for
?US
?plays
?is
?$64/bbl
?and
?$58/bbl
?for
?the
?Canadian
?forma,ons.
?to
?around
?$50/bbl.
?Tight
?oil’s
?key
?problem
?in
?well
?produc,vity
?(see
?adjacent
??gure),
?which
?requires
?the
?repeated
?to
? maintain
?produc,on.
?rapid
?decline
?of
? wells
?drilling
?order
?the
?is
?in
?Source:
?N.
?Dakota
?Dept
?of
?Mineral
?Resources
?6 he US’ need for oil from abroad : 1965 to 2013 Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?Sources:
?BP
?and
?CGES
?Note that we have used finished petroleum product demand as the most appropriate measure of US oil consumption and the one best related to the production of crude oil in the US. This measure of oil product demand excludes natural gas liquids, which are mainly a by-product of natural gas production. The key to understanding the impact of the US shale/tight oil revolution is to examine the amount of oil the US still needs after domestic crude oil production is taken into consideration (the green line). Between 1965 and 1985, the amount of oil the US needed was largely determined by oil demand, because its oil production was fairly static, but after ‘85 US oil output declined almost continuously, giving added impetus to the need for additional oil due to rising oil consumption. The large run-up in the price of oil since around 2003 caused US oil consumption to ?atten ?rst and then weaken, driving the amount of oil needed downwards, a slide that was exacerbated by the sudden surge in US oil production as a result of the tight oil revolution. 7 he US’ need for oil and its imports of crude and oil products, 1965 to 2013 Sources:
?BP
?and
?CGES
?The US’ imports of crude oil re?ect very well the United States’ need for oil from abroad, arrived at by subtracting US oil production from its demand for ?nished petroleum products. The US in determining the amount of crude oil the US needs to import, which depends mainly on the gap between US oil demand and its indigenous supply of crude (as given by the green line). imports around 2 mbpd of products, which have a played a subsidiary role 8 he changing pattern of US crude oil imports (tbpd), Jan-11 to Nov-13 Bow River (Can)Cold Lake (Can)Canadian BlendQua Iboe (Niger.)Bonny LightBrass RiverEa blendEscravosForcados API 22? 20? 38? 36? 34? 38? 35? 34? 30? Sulphur 2.5% 3.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% Saharan Blend 45? 0.1% Pazflor (Angola)DaliaArab LightKuwaiti BlendBolivar (Ven)Orinocco (Ven)Tia Juana (Ven) 26? 24? 34? 30? 17? 16? 32? 0.4% 0.5% 1.8% 2.7% 2.5% 5.0% 1.2% Maya (Mexico) 22? 3.2% Cusiana (Col) 44? 0.2% Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?Sources:
?BP
?and
?CGES
?WT IntermediateLouisiana LightTight oilWT SourAlaskan N. SlopeMars API 37? 37? 43? 33? 33? 29? Sulphur 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 1.3% 0.7% 1.8% US crude outputLight & SweetMedium & SweetMed. & Med/sourMedium & SourHeavy & SourTOTAL 2012 tbpd 3,246 230 901 1,758 614 6,749 2005 tbpd 1,631 434 1,032 1,571 697 5,365 The US tight oil revolution has lightened the US’ crude oil supply slate (see boxes on the right), affecting the provenance of the crudes the US continues to import. Imports of Nigerian crudes ? which are most like the US tight oils ? have declined the most, dropping from 983 tbpd in Jan-11 to a mere 63 tbpd in November 2013, whereas imports from Saudi Arabia have actually increased during this period, helped by S. Arabia’s Motiva joint venture with Shell in the US, with around 1 mbpd of re?ning capacity to feed. 9 Percentage oil export shares 2005 Percentage oil export shares 2012 going West going East going West going East Sources:
?BP
?and
?CGES
? Middle East % 33 West Africa 67 % 67 32 Middle East % 26 West Africa 54 % 74 46 2005 from > to West Africa Middle East US % 45 12 China India Japan Other Asia % 13 7 % na na % 1 22 % 18 38 2012 from > to West Africa Middle East US % 19 11 China India Japan Other Asia % 23 15 % 12 13 % 2 18 % 7 28 The
?decline
?in
?US
?imports
?due
?to
?the
?3ght
?oil
?revolu3on
?has
?a?ected
?mainly
?the
?oil
?trade
?with
?West
?Africa.
?
?Displaced
?barrels
?that
?had
?been
?heading
?to
?the
?US
?from
?West
?Africa
?are
?now
?going
?east
?to
?China,
?India
?and
?the
?rest
?of
?the
?Asia--‐Paci?c
?region.
?
?In
?2005,
?45%
?of
?West
?African
?oil
?exports
?went
?to
?the
?US
?and
?32%
?to
?Asia--‐Paci?c.
?
?By
?2012
?the
?share
?to
?the
?US
?had
?dropped
?to
?19%
?and
?that
?to
?Asia--‐Paci?c
?had
?risen
?to
?46%.
?
?It
?is
?interes3ng
?to
?note
?that
?the
?share
?of
?the
?Middle
?East’s
?oil
?exports
?going
?to
?the
?US
?has
?hardly
?changed;
?instead,
?the
?share
?of
?its
?oil
?exports
?to
?Europe
?declined
?by
?5
?percentage
?points.
?10 ipelines into and out of Cushing, Oklahoma From Canada (tbpd)
590 KeystoneFrom Illinois (tbpd)
190 SpearheadTo Illinois, Indiana (tbpd)
235
180 OzarkBP1Brent and WTI prices ($/bbl), Jan 2010 to Dec 2013 From Oklahoma, Kansas, etc (tbpd) Cherokee
18 Blueknight
20 Great Salt Plains
20 White Cliffs
72 N. Cimarron
32 Hawthorn
120 Cashion
100 To Oklahoma, Kansas, etc (tbpd) Eagle NorthMagellan TulsaSunoco TulsaPhillips BorgerCoffeyville, KaCenturion SouthKansas PoncaOsage Kansas
20
30
70
59
110
60
122
150 From West Texas (tbpd)
450 BasinCenturion N.
90 To the US Gulf (tbpd)
400 Seaway (reversed)
700 Keystone XL
225 Longhorn (reversed)
150 Permian Express IHo-Ho (TX > Louisiana)
500 Planned Seaway twinlinePermian Express IIBridge Tex
450
200
300 Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?One
?unforeseen
?and
?unintended
?consequence
?of
?the
?US
?3ght
?oil
?revolu3on
?and
?increasing
?amounts
?of
?Canadian
?crude
?being
?shipped
?to
?the
?US
?is
?the
?large
?price
?di?eren3al
?between
?WTI
?and
?Brent
?that
?has
?opened
?up
?in
?Brent’s
?favour,
?despite
?Brent’s
?slightly
?inferior
?quality.
?The
?unusual
?di?eren3al
?has
?persisted
?because
?too
?much
?crude
?has
?been
?entering
?the
?storage
?hub
?of
?Cushing,
?which
?is
?the
?delivery
?point
?for
?the
?NYMEX
?WTI
?crude
?futures
?contract,
?and
?not
?enough
?oil
?has
?been
?leaving.
?
?This
?imbalance
?is
?being
?rec3?ed
?slowly
?as
?old
?pipelines
?are
?reversed
?and
?new
?ones
?built
?heading
?towards
?the
?Gulf,
?but
?the
?di?eren3al
?will
?persist
?to
?a
?greater
?or
?long
?as
?restric3ons
?remain
?on
?the
?exporta3on
?of
?US
?crude
?oil.
?lesser
?degree
?as
?11 Number of refineries no. Primary capacity tbpdWorldUSPADD IIPADD IIIN.W. EuropeSaudi ArabiaChinaJapanSouth KoreaIndiaSingapore 797 139 25 54 51 9 143 29 6 22 3 93,967 17,349 3,758 8,771 9,857 2,122 12,271 4,328 3,029 4,317 1,427 Complexity ratio Utilisation FCC equivalent rate % % 51 78 66 83 38 25 89 45 43 61 28 82 86 91 88 87 89 76 83 85 100 82 Sources:
?ENI
?World
?Oil
?and
?Gas
?Review
?and
?CGES
?The
?availability
?of
?rela3vely
?cheap
?crude
?in
?the
?US’
?Midwest
?and
?its
?Gulf
?coast
?(PADD
?districts
?II
?and
?III
?respec3vely)
?and
?the
?virtual
?ban
?on
?crude
?oil
?exports
?from
?the
?US
?have
?yielded
?high
?re?nery
?u3lisa3on
?rates,
?even
?in
?PADD
?II,
?which
?has
?a
?
?With
?domes3c
?US
?oil
?consump3on
?on
?a
?downward
?sloping
?path
?since
?2005,
?re?nery
?u3lisa3on
?rates
?have
?been
?kept
?high
?by
?rising
?oil
?product
?exports.
?lower
?complexity
?ra3o.
?in
?surge
?One
?of
?the
?consequences
?of
?the
?US’
?3ght
?oil
?revolu3on
?its
?oil
?product
?exports,
?which
?has
?been
?a
?increased
?by
?86%
?between
?2005
?and
?2012.
?
?Exports
?to
?South
?and
?Central
?America
?accounted
?for
?39%
?of
?the
?total
?increment,
?followed
?by
?exports
?to
?Europe
?(23%).
?
?La3n
?America
?has
?supply
?de?cits
?in
?gasoline
?and
?middle
?dis3llates,
?whereas
?Europe
?is
?de?cient
?mainly
?in
?middle
?dis3llates.
?
?
?12 il product surpluses and deficits US oil product exports
?2005
?tbpd
?2012
?
?tbpd
?EU
?gasolineEU
?middle
?dis3llates
?850
?--‐
?698
?1,007
?
?--‐
?680
?US
?gasolineUS
?middle
?dis3llatesUS
?heavy
?fuel
?oil
?--‐
?793
?--‐
?578
?--‐
?488
?--‐
?61
?
?676
?
?--‐
?208
?L.
?America
?gasolineL.
?America
?middle
?dist.
?35
?221
?--‐
?647
?
?--‐
?613
?Sources:
?ENI
?
?and
?CGES
?
?2005
?tbpd
?2012
?
?tbpd
?
?136
?409
?
?53
?132
?
?138
?1,007
?GasolineJet
?fuelGas
?oilResidual
?fuel
?oil
?251
?388
?Petroleum
?coke
?347
?503
?TOTAL
?1,010
?2,609
?Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?The tight oil revolution has caused signi?cant changes in the US’ product surpluses and de?cits: its gasoline de?cit has all but disappeared and it now has a large surplus in middle distillates, most of which ?nds its way to Latin America, which since 2005 has moved from a surplus to a large de?cit in this product category. Traditionally, a large part of the US de?cit in gasoline (which was seasonal) was met by imports from the EU. Since 2005 and the collapse in the US’ gasoline de?cit, this trade has declined dramatically, while US gasoline exports have increased threefold over the period.13 inished petroleum product consumption (1966-2013, in tbpd) Sources:
?EIA
?and
?CGES
?These
?ex
?post
?predic3ons
?are
?based
?on
?econometric
?analysis
?of
?US
??nished
?petroleum
?product
?demand
?from
?1966
?to
?2013.
?
?The
?dynamic
?equa3on
?that
?has
?been
?es3mated
?has
?two
?principal
?drivers
??
?US
?GDP
?in
?real
?terms
?and
?a
?weighted
?average
?index
?of
?end--‐user
?petroleum
?product
?prices
?adjusted
?for
?US
?consumer
?price
?in?a3on
??
?and
?its
?average
?predic3on
?error
?is
?1.9%
?over
?the
?sample
?period.
?
?This
?equa3on
?is
?used
?to
?predict
?the
?demand
?for
?petroleum
?products
?in
?the
?US
?going
?forward
?3ll
?the
?year
?2030,
?based
?on
?projec3ons
?of
?real
?US
?GDP,
?consumer
?price
?in?a3on
?and,
?of
?course,
?the
?price
?of
?oil.
?14 ase Case, with US GDP growth at 3% pa and inflation at 2.1% pa between 2013 and 2030 Price of Brent crude in $/bbl Sources:
?EIA
?
?and
?CGES
?The
?global
?impact
?of
?the
?con3nuing
?3ght
?oil
?revolu3on
?in
?the
?US
?will
?in
?the
?future
?depend
?crucially
?on
?(a)
?the
?path
?of
?US
?oil
?produc3on
?and
?(b)
?how
?the
?US
?demand
?for
??nished
?petroleum
?products
?evolves.
?
?The
?future
?paths
?of
?both
?depend
?on
?the
?price
?of
?oil,
?while
?oil
?demand
?depends
?also
?on
?an
?ac3vity
?variable
?like
?US
?GDP
?and
?its
?rate
?of
?growth.
?
?The
?more
?oil
?is
?produced
?and
?the
?less
?is
?consumed
?the
?less
?oil
?is
?needed
?by
?the
?US
?from
?abroad.
?
?In
?the
?base
?case
?US
?crude
?oil
?produc3on
?is
?expected
?to
?con3nue
?to
?rise,
?reaching
?a
?peak
?of
?10.44
?mbpd
?in
?2019,
?at
?which
?point
?the
?US’
?need
?for
?oil
?reaches
?a
?low
?point
?of
?5.4
?mbpd.
?
?Thereacer,
?US
?oil
?produc3on
?declines
?and
?the
?oil
?needed
?obviously
?rises,
?reaching
?9.4
?mbpd
?by
?2030,
?close
?to
?the
?2012
?level.
?Note once again that we have used finished petroleum product demand as the most appropriate measure of US oil consumption and the one best related to the production of crude oil in the US. The price of oil used to predict US oil demand is based on the Brent projections above, but they are adjusted to take into account the eventual convergence between WTI and Brent. 15 ources:
?EIA
?
?and
?CGES
?Sources:
?EIA
?
?and
?CGES
?Low
?price
?case
?with
?US
?GDP
?growth
?at
?3.1%
?pa
?and
?in?aOon
?at
?1.9%
?pa
?between
?2013
?and
?2030.
?High
?price
?case
?with
?US
?GDP
?growth
?at
?2.8%
?pa
?and
?in?aOon
?at
?2.4%
?pa
?between
?2013
?and
?2030.
?
?The
?global
?impact
?of
?the
?con3nuing
?3ght
?oil
?revolu3on
?in
?the
?US
?depends
?on
?(a)
?the
?path
?of
?US
?oil
?produc3on
?and
?(b)
?the
?US’
?demand
?for
??nished
?petroleum
?products.
?
?The
?future
?paths
?of
?both
?depend
?on
?the
?price
?of
?oil,
?while
?oil
?demand
?depends
?also
?on
?an
?ac3vity
?variable
?like
?US
?GDP
?and
?its
?rate
?of
?growth.
?
?Low
?oil
?prices
?s3mulate
?the
?demand
?for
?petroleum
?products
?and
?hasten
?the
?decline
?rates
?of
?oil?elds,
?leading
?to
?a
?growing
?US
?need
?for
?more
?oil
?from
?abroad,
?which
?rises
?to
?the
?mid--‐2000
?levels
?by
?2030.
?
?In
?contrast,
?high
?oil
?prices
?keep
?oil
?demand
?on
?a
?downward
?path
?and
?US
?oil
?produc3on
?at
?high
?levels;
?in
?these
?circumstances,
?the
?US’
?need
?for
?net
?oil
?imports
?declines
?to
?the
?4--‐mbpd
?level
?by
?2020
?and
?stays
?there
?for
?the
?next
?decade.
?Note once again that we have used finished petroleum product demand as the most appropriate measure of US oil consumption and the one best related to the production of crude oil in the US. The price of oil used to predict US oil demand is based on the Brent projections above, but they are adjusted to take into account the eventual convergence between WTI and Brent. 16 7
地域1 北米
国1
地域2
国2
地域3
国3
地域4
国4
地域5
国5
地域6
国6
地域7
国7
地域8
国8
地域9
国9
地域10
国10
国・地域 北米
2014/02/18 Dr. Leo Drollas
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