ページ番号1007330 更新日 平成30年3月5日

China's Gas Expansion and the role of Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation

レポート属性
レポートID 1007330
作成日 2016-02-03 01:00:00 +0900
更新日 2018-03-05 19:32:42 +0900
公開フラグ 1
媒体 セミナー・報告会資料
分野 エネルギー一般天然ガス・LNG
著者
著者直接入力 Keun-Wook Paik
年度 2015
Vol 0
No 0
ページ数
抽出データ China’s Gas Expansion and the role of Sino-Russian Gas CooperationJOGMEC seminar Prof. KEUN-WOOK PAIKSenior Research FellowFEBRUARY 1, 2016Table 1. Comparison of China and Russia, as of 2015. China Russian FederationAreaPopulationPopulation DensityCapitalLargest CityGovernment 9.6 mn sq km1.401 bn140 / sq kmBeijingShanghaiUnitary socialist republicUS$ 11.385 tnUS$ 8,280US$ 3.33 tnUS$ 216 bn17.1 mn sq km0.142 bn8.4 / sq kmMoscowMoscowFederal semi-presidential RepublicUS$ 1.236 tnUS$ 8,447US$ 0.36 tnUS$ 84.5 bnGDP (nominal)GDP per capitaForeign reservesMilitary expenditureSource : IMF World Economic Outlook (Oct 2015) & other sources2hina’s Gas Expansion and the Role of Sino-Russian gas cooperation Changed Environment : ?Oil Price Collapse in summer 2014?US & Russia’s Pivot to Asia policy competition ?LNG : Pendulum move from Seller’s market to Buyer market?Global climate change does matter From Bilateral to Multilateral Cooperation : ?Bilateral (Sino-Russian gas cooperation) vs. Multilateral (Russia-China-South Korea-Japan gas cooperation)?East Africa LNG supply Hub : from Bilateral to Multilateral cooperation, based on Asian Consumers Alliance ?Mozambique Block I and Block IV unitisation scheme?Arctic Northern Route oil and gas supply to Northeast Asian consumers : the option that cannot invite any conflict of interest among the players 3Update of Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation?In May 2014, the deal of long waited POS (Power of Siberia) I gas supply to China, with the 38 bcm/y (US$ 400 bn worth) was a major breakthrough of Sino-Russian gas cooperation, and in Nov 2014 the MOU on POS II (or Aatai)gas supply (with 30 bcm/y) to western China was a big encouragement. ?Oil price collapse in mid-2014 had deprived any significance of the two gas supply deals. The US/EU sanctions against Russia with regard to the Crimean Peninsula annexation drove Japan to hold back from the Vladivostok LNG Project, which requires Japan’s commitment (market and financing provision) for the start of this project. ?In early September 2015, Novatek and China’s Silk Road Fund (SRF) signed an agreement for the purchase of a 9.9% equity stake in the Yamal LNG project. The completion of the deal will make the shareholder structure as follows : NOVATEK (50.1%), Total S.A. (20%), CNPC (20%) and SRF (9.9%). ?At that time, the conversion of POS II’s MOU into a binding agreement was not materialised. Instead, Gazprom had announced the option of a third gas pipeline for its Sakhalin gas export to China via Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok line. -A big question is whether Gazprom’s strategy can protect its pipeline gas market in China? Can Gazprom’s monopoly on pipeline gas export to Asia be justified? 4ource : Gazprom (2014)5Gazprom’s POS I Development Scheme needs to be revised under the current oil price regime. ?POS 1 development scheme is based on Chayanda gas and Kovykta gas development scheme with US$ 55 bn investment. When Vladivostok LNG 3 trains scheme cannot move without Japan’s LNG market provision, it is desirable to take the staged development as there is not enough market to handle the 61 bcm/y gas supply by 2025. ?POS 1’s priority is to supply 38 cm/y of pipeline gas to Northeastern provinces (20 bcm/y) and Bohai Bay gas market (18 bcm/y). The Bohai market is the target of LNG supply from North America and Australia.?With regard to the delay (1-4 years) of POS 1 gas supply, the option of POS 1 extension to Korea from Weihai to Inchon via the Yellow Sea sub-sea pipeline will help the protection of 18 bcm/y pipeline gas market. To maximise the benefit of this subsea pipeline, the option of gas swap between China and Korea based on upstream assets in Russia’s east Siberia and Central Asian Republics, in particular Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan should be explored seriously. (Considering the role of Korean companies in constructing gas treatment plant construction in Central Asia, it will not be difficult to secure the upstream equity (that can handle 5-10 bcm/y production capacity). 6able 3. China’s Primary Energy Consumption by Source 20152000200569.222.22.26.4CoalOilGasHydro, Nuclear & RenewableSource : CNPC (2015)70.819.82.66.866.017.15.711.2China aims at increasing the gas share in 2020, 10.8% and in 2030,15.4%, according to SASAC (Dec 2015). 78able 6. Outlook for China’s Gas Market 20152020COCO31.659.7132.0138.5170.0185.014.95.07.92.035.040.018.86.59.33.040.0ConventionalUnconventional-SG-CBM-CTGImported LNGImported Pipe GasTotalNote : C means conservative projection, and O means optimistic projection. SG means shale gas CTG means Coal to Gas. 30.014.715.070.010.011.610.060.0241.3336.6394.7224.944.075.080.0unit : bcm2030C210.057.320.017.320.070.0120.0457.3O230.0116.060.026.030.080.0130.0556.0Source : CNPC (2015)9In 2015, CNPC had readjusted its gas demand projections by 2030 significantly as the business as usual volume is 100 bcm/y less than the 2012 projection figure. China’s share production performance willaffect the pipeline gas and LNG import fundamentally. CNPC’s figures strongly indicates that pipeline gas import volume willbe definitely bigger than LNG import volume, even though China’s LNGimport terminals’ capacity (stage I + II) will be much bigger than Japan’s LNG import capacity of 85-90 mt/y when around 20 terminals are completed. Beijing leadership may rethink of the Altai route import when the South China Sea’s dispute issue (Spratly Islands) is intensified in the coming years. As Beijing aims at maximising the pipeline oil and gas supply from Russia and Central Asian Republics to reduce its vulnerability of sea-lane supply, Russia could be a full but indirect beneficiary of the South China Sea dispute. In the coming few years, China’s gas import volume will be the biggest in Asia, and it is very necessary to promote gas consumers’ cooperation among Korea, Japan and China proactively. 10hina’s Four Natural Gas Import Gateways NorthwestGateNortheastGateSouthwestGateSource: CNPC 2015Sea LNGGate11Reference :?Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation : The Reality and Implications (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012).?“Sino-Russian Gas and Oil Cooperation Up : Entering into a new era of strategic partnership?”, OIES Paper WPM 59, April 2015. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/WPM-59.pdf?http://www.adjacentoilandgas.co.uk/construction-maintenance/power-of-siberia-pipeline-as-pivot/22199/12
地域1 アジア
国1 中国
地域2 旧ソ連
国2 ロシア
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国・地域 アジア,中国旧ソ連,ロシア
2016/02/03 Keun-Wook Paik
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